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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and * 
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, * 
Husband and Wife, * 
* 
(Plaintiffs) Appellants, * 
vs. * 
* 
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and * Case No. 88-0400 
CLINTON CITY, * 
* Case No. 890071-CA 
(Defendants) Respondents. * 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the Utah Supreme Court's Order dated February 2, 1989, and 
also pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988). The 
ruling appealed from is a Final Order of Dismissal entered by 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on December 26, 1988, in the 
Second Judicial District in and for Davis County, State of Utah, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal which pertain to respondents 
Leroy Webb, Paul Nelson and Clinton City are: 
1. Whether the district court properly dismissed 
appellants1 Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh's instant action 
on the basis that the dismissal of a prior action was an 
involuntary dismissal granted under the authority of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b). 
2. Whether the trial judge properly acted within 
the range of his discretion in involuntarily dismissing the 
Heidlebaughs' first action for their failure to appear at 
scheduled depositions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above-captioned lawsuit is a civil rights action 
against Clinton City, its chief of police, Leroy Webb, 
and one of its detectives, Paul Nelson. Appellants Robert 
Heidlebaugh and Gretta Joyce Heidlebaugh filed a prior 
identical Complaint in September, 1985. 
Clinton City's counsel attempted repeatedly in that 
first action to take the Heidlebaughs1 depositions. After 
Robert Heidlebaugh did not appear for a continued scheduled 
deposition, Clinton City's counsel filed a Motion to Compel 
the Heidlebaughs1 appearance at depositions or in the 
alternative, to have their action dismissed. The Motion was 
set for hearing, but prior to the hearing, counsel agreed that 
the Motion would be stricken and no sanctions sought, if, in 
return, the Heidlebaughs appeared at a set time for a 
deposition. Counsel further agreed that if the Heidlebaughs 
did not appear, that as a sanction, the Court would enter an 
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Order of Dismissal. A written Stipulation to that effect was 
submitted to the Court. When the Heidlebaughs failed to appear 
for their scheduled depositions, the Court imposed the 
agreed-to sanctions, and dismissed the Heidlebaughs1 
Complaint. The Court's Order, however, did not expressly state 
whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "without 
prejudice." 
On February 10, 1988, the Heidlebaughs filed a second 
action against the same Clinton City defendants on the basis 
of allegations identical to those made in the first action. 
The district court dismissed the second action on the basis 
that the first action was dismissed for cause, due to the 
Heidlebaughs1 failure to appear for depositions, and was 
therefore an adjudication upon the merits. Judge Cornaby 
concluded that the Heidlebaughs were barred from bringing this 
second action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This civil rights action was originally filed by 
Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh on or about November 22, 
1985. (R. at 2-3, 7, 16, 71.) In that first action, 
Clinton City's counsel, Robert G. Gilchrist, after a 
discussion with the Heidlebaughs1 then counsel of record, 
John Caine, set the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh for 
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10:00 a.m. on August 13, 1986. (R. at 22.) That deposition 
was later rescheduled for August 12, 1986, pursuant to the 
request of appellants1 counsel, John Caine. (R. at 22.) 
On August 11, 1986, Mr. Caine again contacted 
Robert G. Gilchrist, and indicated that he could not locate his 
clients and therefore the deposition had to be continued. (R. 
at 22.) A second Amended Notice of Deposition was filed for 
the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken at 10:00 
a,aw on September 9, 1986. (R. at 22, 68 & 71.) On 
September 9, 1986, Robert Heidlebaugh failed to appear for 
his deposition. (R. at 68, 71.) On September 23, 1986, 
Robert G. Gilchrist, after being unable to contact the 
Heidlebaughs' counsel of record by telephone, sent a letter to 
Mr. Caine again requesting that he produce his clients for a 
deposition. (R. at 22.) Thereafter, on November 4, 1986, 
Clinton City's counsel moved the district court to compel the 
Heidlebaughs to appear for their depositions or, in the 
alternative, to dismiss their action. (R. at 13, 21-23, 68, 
71.) 
Clinton City's Motion to Compel was set for hearing 
on December 16, 1986. (R. at 13.) Prior to the time of 
hearing, the parties, by and through their counsel of record, 
entered into a written stipulation which stated that if the 
Heidlebaughs did not appear for their depositions on January 5, 
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1987, that the Court would dismiss their Complaint. (R. at 13, 
27-29, 68, 71.) Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh both failed 
to appear for their depositions on January 5, 1987. (R. at 14, 
32-33, 68, 71.) On February 10, 1987, the Court entered an 
Order of Dismissal. The Order did not specify whether the 
dismissal was with prejudice or without prejudice. (R. at 14, 
32-33, 68-69, 71.) 
On February 10, 1988, the Heidlebaughs, relying on 
the savings statute, filed a new Complaint against the same 
Clinton City defendants on the basis of identical allegations 
as those made in the first action. (R. at 1-3, 12-13.) On 
September 26, 1988, Judge Cornaby entered an Order dismissing 
the Heidlebaughs' second action. Judge Cornaby's Ruling 
stated that the dismissal of the first action was granted 
because Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself available for 
a deposition, and therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for 
cause, and constituted an adjudication upon the merits. The 
Court further held that due to the adjudication upon the 
merits, the Heidlebaughs could not rely upon the savings 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) to file their 
second action. (R. at 68-72.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central question posed by the Heidlebaughs' 
appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that 
the dismissal of the original action was an involuntary 
dismissal and an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Rule 
41(b), Utah R. Civ. P. It is well established that under 
Rule 41(b), that the defendant may obtain an involuntary 
dismissal of an action for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute 
or to comply with any Rule of Civil Procedure, or any court 
order. In the first action filed by the Heidlebaughs, 
Clinton City's counsel repeatedly attempted to take the 
Heidlebaughs' depositions. The depositions were scheduled and 
rescheduled upon the request of the Heidlebaughs' prior 
counsel. When Robert Heidlebaugh failed to appear at his 
scheduled deposition on September 9, 1986, Clinton City's 
counsel moved the Court for an Order compelling the 
Heidlebaughs to appear for the depositions, or in the 
alternative to have their action dismissed. Clinton City's 
motion forced the Heidlebaughs' prior counsel, John Caine, to 
agree to the sanction of dismissal if the Heidlebaughs did not 
appear at the next scheduled deposition. Upon the 
Heidlebaughs' subsequent failure to appear for their 
depositions, Judge Douglas Cornaby entered an Order of 
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Dismissal. Although the Order did not specify whether the 
dismissal was with or without prejudice, Judge Cornaby's 
Ruling on Clinton City's Motion to Dismiss the Heidlebaughsf 
second action stated that the dismissal of the first action was 
a sanction imposed for Robert Heidlebaughs1 failure to make 
himself available for depositions. Therefore the Heidlebaughs1 
first action was dismissed involuntarily under Utah R. Civ. 
P., Rule 41(b) for their failure to comply with the rules 
regarding discovery. A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is an 
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise stated in the 
order of dismissal. 
The Heidlebaughs argued that since their prior 
counsel stipulated to a dismissal, that the Court's Order of 
Dismissal was a voluntary dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P., 
Rule 41(a). Thus, the Heidlebaughs contend that the dismissal 
of the first action was without prejudice. However, a party 
cannot convert a motion for an involuntary dismissal to a 
voluntary dismissal merely by stipulating to the dismissal. 
The Heidlebaughs did not "voluntarily" decide to seek 
dismissal. Their failure to comply with discovery and 
Clinton City's Motion to Compel forced the Heidlebaughs' 
prior counsel to enter into the stipulation. The mere fact 
that the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel agreed to such sanction 
does not convert an involuntary dismissal into a voluntary one. 
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A dismissal for a plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter resting within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on 
appeal only for an abuse of such discretion. The trial court's 
determination is entitled to considerable weight on appeal, 
since the trial court is in the best position to assess the 
efforts of the plaintiff to accomplish compliance with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, determination of the 
appropriate discovery sanction is largely within the discretion 
of the trial court, and may be reversed only for abuse of that 
discretion. In this case the trial judge determined that the 
Heidlebaughs' repeated failures to appear at depositions was 
sufficient dilatory conduct that required the sanction of 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As such, the dismissal of the first action was a 
dismissal on the merits barring the Heidlebaughs' second action 
under the doctrine of res judicata. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THIS ACTION BECAUSE OF 
THE HEIDLEBAUGHS' FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR DEPOSITIONS, 
WHICH CONSTITUTED AN INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(b) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
This matter involves two separate, subsequent civil 
actions. Judge Douglas Cornaby of the Second District 
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Court dismissed the first action, but his Order did not specify 
whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. 
Therefore, the key question is whether Judge Cornaby properly 
determined that the dismissal of the first action was an 
involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rather than a voluntary dismissal under 
Rule 41(a). 
Rules 41(a) and (b), Utah R. Civ. P. provide in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), Rule 66, and of any applicable 
statute, an action may be dismissed by 
the plaintiff without order of court 
. . . (ii) by filing a stipulation of 
dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless 
otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal or stipulation, the 
dismissal is without prejudice . . . 
(2) By order of court. Except as 
provided in paragraph (1) of the 
subdivision of this rule, an action 
shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff's instance save upon order 
of the court and upon such terms and 
conditions as the court deems 
proper. . . Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal 
under this paragraph is without 
prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect 
thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of 
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court, a defendant may move for the 
dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. . . . Unless the court 
in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for under this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or 
for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, if the trial court properly dismissed the first 
action pursuant to Rule 41(b), the dismissal is an adjudication 
upon the merits, and the Heidlebaughs are barred from further 
action against the Clinton City defendants. If, on the other 
hand the dismissal was granted under the authority of Rule 
41(a), the dismissal was without prejudice. 
In the first action, Clinton City's counsel made 
several attempts to schedule the Heidlebaughs1 depositions. 
Upon the request of the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel, John 
Caine, Clinton City's counsel, Robert G. Gilchrist, twice 
agreed to reschedule the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh. 
Finally, a deposition was scheduled for September 9, 1986. 
However Mr* Heidlebaugh failed to appear for this 
deposition. Thereafter, Mr. Gilchrist attempted to contact Mr. 
Caine, first by telephone, and then by letter requesting that 
he produce his clients for a deposition. On November 4, 1986, 
Mr. Gilchrist moved the district court to compel the 
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Heidlebaughs to appear for their depositions or, in the 
alternative, to dismiss their Complaint. 
Immediately prior to the hearing on Clinton City's 
motion, Attorney John Caine stated that he would guarantee 
his clients' appearance at a set time for depositions if 
Mr. Gilchrist would agree not to pursue the hearing on his 
Motion and seek monetary sanctions against the Heidlebaughs. 
Mr. Caine further agreed that if his clients did not appear 
for the next scheduled depositions, that as a sanction the 
Court would enter an Order of Dismissal. Although 
Mr. Gilchrist could have requested the monetary sanctions at 
the hearing on his motion, in the interests of saving time and 
expense, he agreed to Mr. Caine's proposal and a stipulation 
was filed with the Court. 
The Stipulation provided: 
The plaintiffs . . . and defendants . . . 
hereby stipulate and agree that based upon 
the plaintiffs' attorney (sic) 
representation that he has located his 
clients, it is hereby stipulated that he 
will produce them for their depositions at 
his office on January 5, 1987, and if the 
plaintiffs fail to appear at that time and 
place, that the plaintiffs agree that the 
Court will dismiss their Complaint filed 
herein. 
(R. at 27.) 
When the Heidlebaughs once again failed to appear for 
the scheduled depositions, Judge Cornaby entered an Order 
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dismissing the Heidlebaughs1 first action. The Order of 
Dismissal stated as follows: 
Based upon the previously submitted 
stipulation of counsel that the plaintiffs 
would appear for their depositions at 10:00 
a.m. on January 5, 1987, the defendants1 
counsel of record, having submitted a 
notice of said depositions, and it being 
represented to the Court that the 
plaintiffs did not appear at the 
above-stated time and place, and that based 
upon the foregoing stipulation that this 
matter would be dismissed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's 
Complaint is hereby dismissed. 
(R. at 32-33.) 
On February 10, 1988, exactly one year after Judge 
Cornaby's Order dismissing the first action, the Heidlebaughs 
filed a second action against the same defendants and on the 
basis of identical allegations as those made in the first 
action. The Heidlebaughs relied on the Utah savings statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953), which provides that if any 
action is commenced within due time, and if the plaintiff fails 
in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff 
may commence a new action within one year after the failure. 
The Heidlebaughs further relied upon Rule 41(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in arguing that an Order of Dismissal 
based upon a stipulation of the parties is without prejudice, 
and therefore not upon the merits. 
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In May of 1988, Clinton City's counsel moved the 
Court to dismiss the Heidlebaughs' second action on the grounds 
that the first action was dismissed involuntarily and therefore 
was with prejudice and on the merits. The Court's Ruling on 
the Motion to Dismiss filed August 8, 1988, stated: 
In that [first] action, the defendants 
notified the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, 
that the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh 
would be taken on August 13, 1986. This 
was continued to September 9, 1986. The 
plaintiffs' attorney could not produce his 
client for a deposition. . . . The 
plaintiffs' attorney stipulated to the 
dismissal only because he could not 
produce his client for a deposition, even 
though he had from June 1986 to 
January 1987 to do so. The dismissal was 
granted because the plaintiff would not 
make himself available for a deposition. 
This was a dismissal"~for cause. It 
operated as "an adjudication upon the 
merits." 
Under the view stated above, the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to the benefits of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which is the saving 
statute. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 68-69.) Thereafter, on September 26, 1988, Judge 
Cornaby entered an Order dismissing the Heidlebaughs' second 
action on the grounds of res judicata. (R. at 70-72.) 
The trial court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs' 
first action under Rule 41(b), based upon appellants' failure 
to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
discovery. Several courts have upheld the sanction of 
dismissal where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a 
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discovery rule or with a court order regarding discovery. 
Since Utah has adopted Rule 41 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., 
federal cases applying Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 41 are 
illustrative in the present case. Madsen v. Borthick, 97 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 18 n. 4 (12/12/88). 
In Carter v. McGowan, 524 F.Supp. 1119 (D. Nev. 
1981), the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada dismissed the plaintiff's second action on the grounds 
of res judicata. During the course of discovery of the 
first action, the defendants submitted a notice to take the 
plaintiff's deposition on July, 1980. Defendants' attorney was 
later advised that the plaintiff was in jail in Salt Lake 
City. Defendants' attorney wrote to the plaintiff and inquired 
as to his availability for the taking of his deposition. By 
letter, plaintiff responded that he hoped to be free in 
October, and would contact defendants' attorney when he was 
able to proceed with the deposition. On September 25, 1980, 
the defendants' attorney mailed to the plaintiff at his Salt 
Lake City mailing address, notice of his deposition to be taken 
on December 3, 1980. The plaintiff did not appear for that 
deposition, nor did he contact the attorney. 524 F.Supp. at 
1120. 
Thereafter, defendants' attorney moved to dismiss the 
action as a sanction provided by Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 37, 
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for the plaintiff's failure to appear for his deposition. The 
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 10, 1981, 
plaintiff filed his second action against the defendants, 
arguing that he was incarcerated until January 28, 1981, and 
that he did not receive the notice of deposition. 
The Nevada Court held that the first action was 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) for the plaintiff's failure to 
comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Court 
disregarded plaintiff's excuses that he was incarcerated at the 
time of the deposition, and that he had never received the 
Notice of Deposition. According to the Carter Court, a 
dismissal on the grounds of failure to comply with the rules of 
civil procedure bars a subsequent action, unless the court 
otherwise specifies. 
Similarly, in the case of Nasser v. Isthmian 
Lines, 331 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the 
plaintiff's second action on the grounds of res judicata. 
In that case, after the defendant had answered and the 
plaintiff's deposition had been taken, the defendant sent 
written interrogatories to the plaintiff's attorney. The 
plaintiff failed to meet the deadline in answering the 
defendant's written interrogatories. Thereafter the court 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to answer 
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the interrogatories. The plaintiff subsequently brought a 
second action against the defendants. However, the district 
court awarded summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds 
of res judicata. 
On appeal the plaintiff argued that a dismissal for 
failing to answer interrogatories was a drastic sanction, 
unless there was evidence of the plaintiff's willfulness. The 
second circuit court held that the questions going to the 
propriety of the dismissal of the first action, and the 
willfulness of the plaintiff's default, were now foreclosed and 
the judgment below must be affirmed. 331 F.2d at 126-127. The 
Nasser Court cited Costello v. United States, 3 65 U.S. 
265 (1961), a factually dissimilar case, for the proposition 
that a dismissal for failure to comply with the rules of civil 
procedure regarding discovery is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 41(b) and is an adjudication upon the merits unless the 
court otherwise specifies. Id. at 127, 129. See also 
Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 249 F.2d 886 (6th 
Cir. 1957) (where plaintiff's original suit is dismissed for 
failure to attend the taking of his deposition, such dismissal 
constitutes a judgment upon the merits, is res judicata and 
becomes an effective bar to any subsequent action); Paxton 
v. State, 21 Hawaii App. 46, 625 P.2d 1052 (Hawaii 1981) (the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the 
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plaintiff's action for failure to timely answer defendant's 
interrogatories); Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp,, 634 
F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1980) (court upheld the district court's 
dismissal of the plaintiff's action for failure to comply with 
the court's order requiring that all discovery be completed 
within six months). 
The above authorities indicate that the trial court 
may properly dismiss an action under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) for plaintiff's failure to comply with the 
discovery rules. In the present case, Judge Cornaby properly 
dismissed the Heidlebaughs' first action for their repeated 
failure to make themselves available for depositions. Since 
the Order of Dismissal did not state that the dismissal was 
without prejudice, Rule 41(b) dictates that the dismissal 
constituted an adjudication upon the merits. Therefore the 
Heidelbaughs were barred from further action against 
Clinton City, and their second action was properly dismissed 
under the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Heidlebaughs contend that because Attorney John 
Caine stipulated to the sanction of dismissal, the Court's 
order dismissing their first action was a voluntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(a), and was therefore a dismissal without 
prejudice. However a party to an action cannot convert a 
motion under Rule 41(b) of the rules of civil procedure into an 
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agreement to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) by consenting to a 
dismissal, unless all parties consent to that particular type 
of dismissal. Wight v, United Pacific Ins, Co., 154 F.Supp 
548, 551 (D. Utah 1957). The Heidlebaughs contend that if 
41(a)(1)(ii) regarding stipulations is not applicable to this 
case, then 41(a)(2) applies. That subpart states that at a 
plaintiff's instance an action may be dismissed by court order, 
and unless otherwise specified in the order, such dismissal is 
a dismissal without prejudice. However the Heidlebaughs* 
reliance upon any subdivisions of Rule 41(a) is unfounded since 
the dismissal of the first action was not "voluntarily" agreed 
to by the Heidlebaughs and their prior counsel. 
The term "voluntary" in Rule 41 means that the party 
is filing the dismissal without being compelled to do so by 
another party or by the court. Randall v. Merrill-Lynch, 
820 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 108 
S. Ct. 753. The Heidlebaughs did not voluntarily decide to 
drop their first action, but instead were forced to dismiss it 
when they failed to comply with the rules of discovery by 
failing to appear for their depositions. The Heidlebaughs1 
prior counsel, John Caine, never indicated to Clinton 
City's counsel, Robert Gilchrist, that the Heidlebaughs had 
decided to drop their suit. Instead, he agreed that they would 
be subject to the sanction of dismissal if they did not appear 
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for a deposition. As stated in the Court's Ruling on Clinton 
City's Motion to Dismiss the second action, the only reason Mr. 
Caine stipulated to the dismissal was because he could not 
produce his clients for depositions. 
Mr. Caine was compelled to sign the stipulation 
because of Clinton City's motion to compel. Therefore the 
Heidlebaughs may not rely on any subdivisions of Rule 41(a). 
As Judge Cornaby stated in his Ruling the dismissal of the 
first action was a sanction imposed for the Heidlebaughs' 
repeated failure to appear at depositions, and was properly 
granted under the authority of Rule 41(b). Pursuant to Rule 
41(b), the dismissal of the first action was thus on the merits 
and with prejudice. The Heidlebaughs' second action was 
therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata and was 
properly dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS BROAD DISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE DISCOVERY 
SANCTIONS AND IN GRANTING AN INVOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL, AND SUCH DISMISSALS SHOULD ONLY 
BE REVERSED ON APPEAL FOR AN ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION 
A trial judge has broad discretion in determining 
whether to grant a dismissal for violations of discovery 
rules or for violations of a court order regarding discovery. 
The choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily 
the responsibility of the trial judge and will not be reversed 
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absent an abuse of discretion. First Federal Savings & Loan 
Assoc, v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with a court order or for 
failing to respond to discovery requests are within the court's 
discretion. A discretionary determination may be reviewed only 
in the case of a gross, clear, plain, palpable, or manifest 
abuse of discretion. GM Leasing Corp. v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975). Generally 
the trial court is vested with wide discretion in matters of 
discovery and its decision will not be disturbed except where 
there is abuse of discretion. Rogers v. Fenton, 115 Ariz. 
217, 564 P.2d 906, 907 (1977). 
The Court's power under Rule 41(b) to enter a 
dismissal based on a failure to prosecute or to obey a court 
order or federal rule is an inherent aspect of its authority to 
enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits. 
Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 
1985). The standard of review on appeal from a dismissal of a 
lawsuit is abuse of discretion. Dynes v. Army Air Force 
Exchange Service, 720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983). 
Therefore although the Heidlebaughs are correct in stating that 
the remedy of dismissal should be granted only in extreme 
cases, the trial court clearly has broad discretion in 
determining when to grant such a sanction. 
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There is no evidence of a "gross," "clear," "plain," 
"palpable," or "manifest" abuse of discretion in the present 
case. The Heidlebaughs do not dispute the fact that Clinton 
City's counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to take the 
Heidlebaughs1 depositions. The Heidlebaughs do not dispute 
that the depositions were rescheduled several times upon their 
prior counsel's requests, nor do they dispute that Robert 
Keidlebaugh failed to appear for two separate depositions. 
Such repeated failures to comply with discovery are sufficient 
cause for which a court may properly grant a dismissal upon the 
merits. Carter v. McGowan, supra; Nasser v. Isthmian 
Lines, supra; Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 
supra; Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 
1967), cert, denied, 388 U.S. 919 (1967) (Although the 
sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court 
may apply, where plaintiffs did not once appear for the taking 
of depositions and did not give an indication that they 
intended to appear in the future, it is clear beyond any 
question that the district court properly granted an Order of 
Dismissal). 
The Heidlebaughs argue that where a dismissal comes 
about by reason of the attorney's fault, a dismissal without 
prejudice is a drastic sanction imposed upon the client. 
However, it is generally held that a party is bound by the 
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actions of his lawyer. In the case of Link v. Wabash R.R. 
Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the Supreme Court stated: 
There is certainly no merit to the 
contention that dismissal of petitioner's 
claim because of its counsel's unexcused 
conduct imposes an unjust penalty on his 
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose his 
attorney as his representative in the 
action, and he cannot now avoid the 
consequences of the acts or omissions of 
this freely selected agent. 
Id. at 633-34. See also Corchado v. Puerto Rico 
Marine Mgmt., Inc., 665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Chira, 634 F.2d at 
666-667; Nasser, 331 F.2d at 129. 
Because an involuntary dismissal of the Heidlebaughs1 
first action was within the discretion of the trial court and 
because the Heidlebaughs have failed to show any evidence of a 
gross, clear, or manifest abuse of that discretion, the trial 
court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs' first action 
pursuant to Rule 41(b). A dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), 
unless otherwise stated in the Court's order, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. In the present case since Judge 
Cornaby's Order did not state that the dismissal was without 
prejudice, the dismissal was on the merits and the Heidlebaughs 
are bound by that adjudication. Therefore the second action 
they instituted against the Clinton City defendants was 
properly dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Heidlebaughs' first action, Clinton City's 
counsel repeatedly attempted to take the Heidlebaughs' 
depositions. John Caine, the Heidlebaughs' prior counsel, 
was unable to produce the Heidlebaughs, therefore, the 
depositions were rescheduled twice. Thereafter, Robert 
Heidlebaugh failed to appear for his deposition. Upon 
Clinton City counsel's motion to compel discovery or in the 
alternative to dismiss the action, a stipulation was entered 
wherein Mr. Caine guaranteed his clients' appearance at the 
next scheduled deposition. When the Heidlebaughs failed to 
appear for their scheduled depositions, the trial court 
dismissed the Heidlebaughs' action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with 
the agreed to discovery request. Pursuant to that rule 
dismissal of the Heidlebaughs' action is an adjudication upon 
the merits and is final. Such a dismissal was clearly within 
the broad discretion of the trial court and may not be reversed 
absent a clear abuse of the judge's discretion. Therefore the 
same trial court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs' second 
action against the Clinton City defendants on the grounds of 
res judicata. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
GARY D. STOTT 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA 
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and 
CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Civil No.: 38432 
The plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of 
record, John Caine and defendants, by and through their 
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, hereby stipulate and 
agree that based upon the plaintiffs' attorney representation 
that he has located his clients, it is hereby stipulated that 
he will- produce them for their depositions at his office on 
January 5, 1987, and if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that 
time and place that the plaintiffs agree that the court will 
dismiss their complaint filed herein. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
Attorneys for Defendants 
RICHARDS, CAINE AND RICHARDS 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2-
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing stipulation of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiffs will appear at 
their attorneys' office on January 5, 1987, at 10:00 a.m. for 
their depositions, and if they fail to appear at that time that 
upon notice to the court, that this matter will be dismissed. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. C0RNA3Y 
District Court Judge 
HEIDLEB2/RGG 
JW12176 
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EXHIBIT " B " 
GARY D. STOTT 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA 
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and 
CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
C i v i l N o . : 38432 
Based upon the previously submitted stipulation of 
counsel that the p la int i f f s would appear for their depositions 
at 10:00 a.m. on January 5, 1987, and the defendants' counsel 
of record having submitted a notice of said depositions, and 
i t being represented to the court that the p la int i f f s did not 
appear at the above stated time and place, that based upon the 
foregoing st ipulat ion that th i s matter would be dismissed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint 
i s hereby dismissed. 
DATED t h i s lQ day o f ftbr\U(.n/ , 1987. 
Approved? a s t o Form: 
// 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
\ROBEjRT G. GILCHRIST 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendants 
HEIDLEB3/RGG 
JW157 
BY THE COURT: 
OOUGLA? "-CORNABY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J . CORNABY 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the 
County of Davisr State of Utah 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEROY WEBB, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 42977 
The defendants' motion to dismiss came before the court for 
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing 
for the plaintiff-* and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the 
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under 
advisement. The court now rules on the motion. 
The motion to dismiss is granted. 
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior 
action is res judicatta. 
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same 
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That 
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified 
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert 
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986. This was 
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could 
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986, 
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the 
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a 
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear 
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action 
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
r 
EB H)S 
C'--'r 
iL 
-9 
• Tp:; 
i * • -
r»»» 
37. C 
1 1 C 
1:20 
Z'SXl 
IfaiT" 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEROY WEBB, et al.. 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 42977 
The defendants1 motion to dismiss came before the court for 
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing 
for the plaintiff-5 and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the 
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under 
advisement. The court now rules on the motion. 
The motion to dismiss is granted. 
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior 
action is res judicatta. 
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same 
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That 
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified 
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert 
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986. This was 
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could 
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986, 
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the 
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a 
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear 
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action 
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February 
10, 1987, the court signed the order of dismissal. The order 
does not specify that the dismissal is with prejudice or without 
prejudice. Rule 41(b) provides: 
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or 
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits." 
This is so notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1). The 
plaintiff's attorney stipulated to the dismissal only because he 
could not produce his client for a deposition even though he had 
from June, 1986, to January, 1987 to do so. The dismissal was 
granted because the plaintiff would not make himself available 
for a deposition. This was a dismissal for cause. It operated 
as "an adjudication upon the merits." 
Under the view stated above the plaintiffs are not entitled 
to the benefits of Utah Code 78-12-40 which is the saving 
statute. 
The defendants are ordered t o draw a formal order cons i s tent 
with t h i s order . 
Dated August 4, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Peter C. Collins, P. 0. 
Box 2668, .Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 and Robert G. 
Gilchrist, P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August 
4, 1988. y j 
Deputy Clerk 
EXHIBIT "D" 
CA.b .:.',:v. UTAH. 
O SE? 26 p;« 12= 13 
:0 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER ClZ:..'..- - - • * ---^  
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants EYl £ 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 L 
50 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
LEROY WEBB, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 42977 
The defendants' motion to dismiss having come on for 
hearing before the court on August 2, 1988, with the plaintiffs 
being represented by counsel of record Peter C. Collins, and 
defendants being represented by counsel of record Robert G. 
Gilchrist, and the court having heard argument, and having 
reviewed the file 
THAT IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that defendants* motion i? 
granted. .In reaching its ruling, the court finds the following 
facts: 
flU© 
^.v 
1. On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs herein 
sued the same defendants herein on allegations virtually iden-
tical to those set forth in this action. 
2. In that action, Civil Number 38432, the defendants 
submitted, on June 17, 1986, a notice of the deposition of 
Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken on August 13, 1986. 
3. The deposition was subsequently continued by 
notice to September 9, 1986. 
4. Neither plaintiff showed up. 
5. On November 4, 1986, the defendants moved the 
court to compel the deposition or in the alternative to dismiss 
the action. 
6. On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties 
reached a written stipulation, which required Robert Heidlebaugh 
to appear for a deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plain-
tiffs1 action would be dismissed. 
7. The deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh was not held 
on January 5, 1987. 
8. On February 10, 1987, the court signed an order 
of dismissal, to which plaintiffs' counsel in that action had 
signed his approval. 
The court concludes that the dismissal was granted 
because the plaintiff Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself 
available for a deposition (the court makes no finding on the 
question of whether he or plaintiff Joyce Heidlebaugh ever 
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received notice of that or any of the other deposition dates), 
and that, therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for cause. A 
dismissal for cause is an adjudication upon the merits. An 
adjudication upon the merits does not entitle the plaintiffs 
to rely on U.C.A. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a 
second action, even though such a second action, this action, 
was fil«*d in timely fashion pursuant to that statute. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the court hereby 
orders, adjudges and decrees that the plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, are all hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs 
incurred herein. 
DATED this *C day of _ SSi^/- , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
HONORABLE DOOGLAS L. CORNAB) 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
/"• 
<x<& iO ' 
^ 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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